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INTRODUCTION 
_~ ~ ThÉ_~ process of wage determination is one of the most 
- J:=JKKKK:::K:K::_=JJ=J_K_~JJJ==J::::JJJJJJJ:::::::::JJJJJJJJ_ .. _----_._--_.- - -----_. JJJ~ - -+- _ •• 
''''\- . J~J - .,----
important ~ institutional features of an economy. It determines the 
response to exogenous shocks and affects the long run perfomance as far 
as employment is concerned. For most western European countries the role 
of unions in that process is very important, regardless the size of the 
unions i tse·lf. It has become fashionable the explici t consideration of 
the unions both in theoretical and empirical macroeconomics. In this 
papel", a very' particular issue of a unionized labour market is analyzed; 
vle shall study an economy wi th several unions, and consider the different 
wage/employment outcomes wichrÉsult~from alternative strategic behaviour 
of those (rational) unions. The model adopts a differential game format 
in wich each union choses i ts policy instrument, taking in account the 
(passive) response of the employer (through the labour demand) and the 
~ÉxistÉncÉ of other union(s) operating in the same firmo The state 
variable is the 'liage level; i ts 
choosen by the union plus SOme 
dynamic i5 driven by the instruments 
exogenos factors wich determine the 
relative. bargaining power of Lirm and unions. The dynamic constraint of 
the model is rather ad hoc, i t may be interpreted as coming up [rom a 
bargaining setting under uncertainty as is loosely described somewhere 
e1se (Andrés (1985». A quick sketch of the process is given below. 
Wages are determined by long term contracts wich are 
negotiated at a pOint in " time. This fact, and the difficul ty in finding 
mÉan~ingfu1 variables causing wages in an econometric sense EAshÉ~fÉl tel' 
and Card (1983», has led most É~pirical studies of the labour market to 
rnacrocconc::üc '/~:,i,:üJlÉs ~'KKK:Kch ...,,, _~KKK" c" .... _. 
'--' J"'¡:J'J'~J/ .,.- ' .. ' , 
unions, things are different. rK';ag~s are no ~ongÉ!"' exogne0us and JJ:~1~ .cae '. 
that no single party can deci.de 9.001Jt: -:he::1, :-:-lakes rOOr:1 for sar.le st:,atE:gl.': 
._ - - " '_ •• ~_ •• - o •• ~K' 
~J,J , 
2. 
Nevertheless there is a mutual influence bet"een the t"o 
__ --=-::-:=types-o!:=cteci""ions-;--::The-- outcome-of--the-negotiation, i. e; -"ages, -"ill 
affect the __ performance of the firm and the utili ty of the unions, the 
everyd?y production and pricing choices and the union'spolicy instrument 
"ill_affect the negotiation and Mnce the "age i tself. 
The joint determination of prices, . "ages, employment and 
union's instrument, may then be put in a dynamic optimization formato The 
model considers then an explicit optimizing behaviour for' both unions aná 
fims, "hereby they choose their respective policy instruments, subject to 
the constrain of the wage dynamics. It is this las ')i t the one wich is 
-/ 
--not -expl,icitely derived from the bargaining process, for no formal model 
is supplied. The equation is taken as a linear approximation to a wage 
equation coming up from a bargaining setting (loosely speaking) and 
fo11owing Cramton (Cramton (l983)) it includes the follo\'¡ing "2l"iables: 
l ----
where, w (t) is the (real) "age, C (t) stands by the costs of delaying 
the agreement and Z. (t) the exogenous factors behind the desired wage 
1 
settlement for bothe the union and the firmo In a bargaining modal under 
uncertainty C(t} will include strikes (as the means by \;ich the uníon 
makes the delay costly for the firm) and inventories (as the 
corresponding firm' s defense against industrial acUon). Sorne econometríc 
work carded out by author (Andres (1984)) also supports the idea of 
bringing those two variables in an strlJctural '¡¡age equation. A four 
dImensional vector autorregreslon analós~s '!ia'?0S. 
and Card I s resul ts for the fj. S. (Ashenf'e 1 ter 2.:.0 Ca:-c ',1322 , ). ':'('.e 
s imilari ty found between the causali ty patterns for tOé t'/;o c:c~~nt:~ es ','/as 
in fact outstanding. Wages. in partioula~, 
autorregressive process' and no other variab1..e &J::J:KJ:~s 
. _ .. ~JJ" JJ~ JJJJJJJ'~JJ~JJJ" 
3. 
- The consideration of strikes and inventories produces-a 
dramatic change in those results. Both variables (jointly and otherwise) 
. ------------------ ~J ---
strongly cause--wages- in an econometric sense. On- top -of -this the - general 
________ -unrestricted ,ve9tor_autorregressive ~~ mo,!el, ~:J_displaós _ most long run 
properties one would like to find: long run positive (negative) 
coefficient of strikes (inventories) - on wages, long run neutrali tyof 
nominal variables in the demand for labour, long run zero elasticity, of 
inventories in the demand for labour, and so·on. For all this (1) can be 
- wri tten as. 
where: S(t) = sorne strike variable. 
I(t) = inventories. 
The 3eneral framework for the determinaticn of prices (p (t; ) 
, 
employment (n(t»,' wages (w(t»), inventories (I (t» and strikes (s (t j , 
.. 
·takes- the form of a differentral game. The union chosses the level e:' 
, 
industrial action to carry out at each particular point in time, whereas 
the firm chosses prices 'and employment. In so doing they take in aCCOU:1-: 
two dynamic constraints: the outcome of the bargaining process (i.e. Thó 
wage dynamics) and the stock accumulation dynamics. 
This framework is able to produce a set of Euler equatior.s 
that may consti tute the basis of an empirical rational expectations 
modelo Unfortunately given its complexity it is helpless if one prefers 
closed form solutions Or even to obtain clear cut resul ts. Ha'/ing th~~J::: 
.. ~~~_IJ'~ __ ~ .... ,..:o •• ~KJJ_ .... '.-.., .... .,41" 
va.\. .A.-,;:¡. .... .L-. .... "" :J'~ ................... ~ <.... .,'->-- .... --'--J 
dynamic struc~urÉ with a system of six diffÉr~ntia¡ equasiuns. 
Once we depart from the simplest case of s:/."":ietric pla~rÉ::'3, 
choosing cne single instrument eac!1, an-:: ... .0>: " -
-- - _.-.= 
dynamics of one single state variable! the a~~~'!sls :~ R:~~:~d~p ~2~_ 
" I .. , 
4. 
This paper is to SOrne extent a simplifying example of what 
can be attempted in the framework outlined at the begining of this 
section. For this reason, and to be able to get explicit solutions sorne 
further assumptions are needed. The union's size is assumed to be 
exogenously determined mainly On the basis of ideOlogical prefferences 
and the like. This assumption is not difficult to accept per se, 
nevertheless in our context i t would mean that strikes could have not 
only a role in the wage negotiations but also a signalling role for th,e 
mili ttancy or otherwise of the union. This point is not considered to 
keep things simple. Similarly the treatment of u 'rtainty is naive and 
, 
no actempt is made of capturing all the possible "ay" in wich uncertainty 
can be brougth into. 
Section 11 presents the general dynamic structure of the 
oligopoly model, the saddle point. nature of th6 equilibrium and the 
\ 
dynamics following alternative exogenous shocks are discussed. In section 
IU we introduce the non-cooperative approach under alternative 
inform~tional assumptions. The steady state resul ts for the cooperati ve 
and non-cooperati ve scenarios are presented. '11e stablish a ranking of the 
equilibrium values of the main variables (wages, strikes, employment) and 
the short and long run mul tipliers following exogenous shocks, '11e obtain 
a e lear ranking not only among the cooperati ve and non-coopera ti '/e 
solutions, but also bet"een the open-loop and closed-loop ones; this 
remarks the importance of the informational assumptions in dynamic games. 
Section IV considers the simple model in an uncertain environment about 
the bargaining power of the firmo Under sorne símplifying assumptions 
abou"':: the stochastic nature of 1:r,8 sr,ocks hi ttin.=: "1";he er:0f""\0rlJ: ,'le f'lri-:,(""l, ..... c 
again an unambig:....,?us comparls'::'on ,.;.:i. th thB :88-"";'1. +:s ..... ;j .:;ec':i.' .... :-¡ 
explained in terms of the underlying !"'':'sk aversion o: unior.s. ~n ~~¡lÉ 
final section we present sorne special remarks and concluss:o;.s. 
· ". ~J... 
5. 
li ttle illuminating. Numerical simulation and partial resul ts are then 
required. To avoid this and to obtain clear-cut resul ts ',¡.e develop sone 
simpler models, focusing on one or two main features at time. 
In this paper I put aside the main purpose of the l'esearch, 
to put forward a rather simpler model in wich sorne of the features of 
what is coming next, can be shown more clearly. Having two (or n for what 
matters) symetric players and a simple state variable permits us to carry 
out a simpleanalysis in a world of two dimensions. Proceeding in this 
way we can al so take SOrne already well stablished resul ts in the field of 
international policy coordination (Miller and Salmon (1983) ) or 
oligopolistic ressource markets (Van Der Ploeg (1984». 
Only one side of the ultimate problem is taken here. In this 
example t~Il active unions choose the optimal level of industrial action, 
taking in account the \'/af;e dynamics constraint as \'/el1 as the labou:, 
demand shedule. The firm here plays nO role other than a passi'le follo'.-ler 
choice of the optimal level of employment taking '.-Iages as given. 
Athough the simplici ty of the framework must pl'event us fro," 
drawing too occurl'ate conclussions out of the analysis, the study ol' " 
world with several unions is both intuitively and in practice rather more 
appealing. In many european countries several unions exist in the sar.:e 
sectors stablishing wage contracts wich hold for any ·.10l'kel' in the sector 
regardless of his union status. It can be interesting then to discuss a 
little bit what difference does it make wathel' unions cooperate al' not, 
and in general the alternative informational assu:Tlptions \'Iich are crucial 
with several unians in sn oligopo:~3:i~ fra~~~c~~, o~~ 2p~~Mach diffÉ~s 
from his in two main aspests. ?~i~c~::~g the ~~É~~J~s d~p=rp3io~ ~hÉ ~a;= 
is homogeneous and each union nÉgo~~a~És ~C~ ai~ ~nÉ ~l~~~I·pK 
E 6. 
Ir THE COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
Let us consider two unions and a single firmo Each union 
cares about the utility of its own members, but in so doing signs up 
contracts of overall applicabili ty. The wage equation fo1101"s from the 
discussion in the previous section, and takes on the formo 
where the wage outcome depends negatively on the current wage and 
posi ti vely on the level of industrial action in the manner already 
discussed. y . captures he re a -,¡hole bunch of exogenous factors wich tl \'1 
may affect the OIage outcome trough the bargaining power of each party_ 
The objective function of ~hÉ i
tn 
player is. 
where 
~Max 
s. (t) 
1 
u. (t) = w(t) n. (t) - y, S2 (t) 
1 1 1 
(4) 
(5 ) 
The utili ty is affected by the wage bill in a conventional 
manner minus the cost associated to industrial disputes. The labour 
demand schedule is finally the conventional one: 
':. 
n (t) = rn (t) -'P w (t) o (6 ) 
v Ó n is again a scuf-c fac-::::.r 'die!: c:e.p'C'-..res s.n/ 'exoge!10USJ e:;"erlenc ~nK 
t~É labour demand other tha.r: 'dages¡ i,e, prMd'J'':'''''i'li~Yi d~""',::s1d; e"":{" , ". 
I finally a~sumÉ fuil 3yr.1etry and hÉ~CÉ 
n (t) n (t) 
·2 (7 ) 
7. 
Let us analyze the cooperati ve solutíon (e j wich will be 
useful as a benchmark. By this we mean that the two unions get together 
tó decide the optimal S .. They do so by maximizing a weighted average of 
1 
the two objective functions subject to all the constraints in the modelo 
1 assume an equal weight on each union's welfare functíon. 
The solutíon is obtained by an straightforward application 
of the optimal control tecniques. Let the current value hamil tonian 
defíned for T 
c' 1"'- (t)) 
= y, (W(t) ((n (t) + 
f c (t) (- ~ w (t) + {>\, (SI (t) + S2(t) + r VI (t)) (8) 
Vlhich gives: 
H = -Y, S1 + c< ~c = O s (9 ) 
H = - Y,s + 
,x t" = O s 2 ( 10) 
H = Y, E~" -21 \'1) - r( = - r + r w (11 ) 
(9) and (10) are the usual first arder condi tions (? O. C.) -for an 
optimum. The interpretation is in the usual narginal 8ense i i t is 'Ilorth 
noting how (as it couldn't be othe:"Jlise) strikes are obs8:''led at al~ so 
1 ..... ,..,.,.... " ..... ,¡...t-. ..... ""'~'"'_ 1... ___ ..... +- ~ _ ..... ,..,. _~ ..... ,", lKKK_~ __ "~' _____ ._<_ 
.......... 6 <;....:> <~" ... -..... ...... V¡¡ "00 6Y" _1 .. -'" .... 'J~ y .... oK~ 6Cl.--.·' .... ~1R .:--1,--,,', '.;_ 
unian will strike until :he ~oin~ in wich ~hÉ rnargi~al ~cst of ~ur~~9r 
action l~pK) equals the ITiargitlal ~;aluéiJ:ion 2.:1 tet'ffiS o:" :;:g:--:'2::- 'I:e.ge. 
1 
(11) is the arbitrage cor;d:'''.::'Jn '.::--.a: resul-:'::'ng ',.¡ages -·_3-: sa-::..sr:; a':" :he 
optimur:;. 
8 . 
• e 
r + (ll' ) -
LHS (11') captures the expected rate of return of yet a further small 
increase in wages, it consists of two elements. (V / {-" J is the capi tal 
gain and E,,~, ( r (\ _ "2. (1)(.1.)\) is the current return bit as the increase 
in the wage bill. RHS (11') is on the other hand the rate of return that 
can be obtained from the allocation of those· ressources needed to 
increase W to an alternative use. r es the pure financial return that 
could achieve some'l,here else in a perfect capi tal market, and ! 
return in terms of future wage increases. 
../ 
Tr.a next step is to convert the set of (9 ) (11 ) 
conditions into a simple system of differential equations, to study 80th 
t'le dynamics and the steady state for T-'" ro ) of the system. 
Exploi ting the syrnetry, of the model \'/e can aggrega te over (9) and (10) 
ans use the resulting equation plus (11) and (3) to g~t (Appendix l)~ 
Where: 
a11 
a12 
a21 
a22 
bu 
r. 
.... 12 
b 22 
W 
= 
• 
S 
= - f.> 
= el, 
=4 1)( '1> 
=( (> +Z") 
=1 
=-20, 
a11 a 12 vi bU b121 r'l' 
+ ( 12) b2~ In a 21 a22 S b21 
e 
9. 
There are two things to care about in system (12). wether it satisfies 
the saddle point condí tion and how 
like. Let the matrices ¡:f, 'i. il~i\ 
do the long 
'Re. ,{ b~j) 
how the saddle point condition is satisfied foro 
run mul típliers look 
and is easy to chech 
Diagramatically is easy to check how system cam be represented by the 
foollowing"phase diagram 
r 
L 
• s~o 
F 
~JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ¿s 
,¡ í , t \ 
\},le. "- - t tr: (('>+\) .¡.2<:>:af" 1 " - ").\ t:,c. , ~ \ ") 
r 
.., 
\ ( " . \ ,\ I I -2 " Se. "- - 20( ,~r 4.J r \ \ ( 1 L¡ \, 
flc 
, '-., ¡ (l i 'il.)..¡ '! , / , 
i-.l L • J 
1 shall assume r '( (\ ,>"2 f QI)J such that we get 
state (W • S ) in the positive cuadrant (NOTE 1) 
e e 
10. 
a mÉaning~ul steady 
• ~~K) ~~ are the 
corresponding steady state values of the exogenous shift factors. 
~or 
The steady state solutions for n and ~ 
completeness. 
can also be shown 
which ís also posí tíve if" the condi tion for p0si ti ,ieness of Se is met. 
Finally 
(16) 
wich is al sO positive under the same assumption. 
Notice ho" (16) shows the steady state value of as the present o 
disco'..l!"'.ted value of the future stream of increases in \</age bill due te 
h"" .... ; -.¡... ..... ~, .... ,..., 
KK,~ .-. ___ J ...... u";> 
o(w f\'J \ 
~ .' ú' \. 'J 2 
'-
For in the steady I when no further changes in the exogenous 
variables are expected. the marginal valuation of.a further steady state 
wage increase is the PDV of a11 future wage bi11 increases discounted 
back at the effective rate r + (6 
The long run multipliers are easi1y obtained from (13)-(15). 
Let' s show them and introduce a fe'" interpretative comments. 
d~" >0 (17) 6K~" >0 ( 18) 
o. ~ \\l o.qa 
dSe LO (19) 
¿ Se: >D (20) 
J I¡I.I) Ó. fl\ 
Ó. (\ e L.o (21) c\ (\ c. >0 (22) 
óKt~ CHn 
~ft LO (23) CHl.L >0 --(24) 
c\ ~w d Ir\. 
(17) and (18) are fairly clear. Positive shifts in ~ N • ~ (l i7.;oC'o·!e 
worker' s bargaining power and hence lead to higher wage grQ'.,t:". ·19) 
reflects how this improvement in the bargaining power pÉr~::R a 
reduction in the number of strikes to achieve a real wage targ~~K i. 20) 
however shows hÚ!.'l a producti vi ty shock (say) \'lich does not produce af1 
inmediate wage push but a higher labour demand, mus t be gai!1ed by 
','¡OrKerS as higher wages "C:--:rougn a:-, :"nc~É2sírKg indus~!""ialK ad:"'~C;~~K 
":""-'" the ",JJKKK,~ ..... "~c>"",:,,, -- .;-' ~'J'J' .c...' -
shocks. (23) (24) tell us no\'.' a pi:~É ·,·¡age shock leads t:) a ~igrKÉ:J, 'I:ag~ 
but reduces the marginal 'raluation cf ~~rthÉr increases; ~hÉn ~~É R~MC~ 
is employment increasing) thougl1) i:- leacs -:0 a hi.gher m3Krgi~~K:::l '/3:":-,::;' E)~­
the sta te variable. 
1 
1 
1 
-l 
~ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
l j 
1 j 
~, 
1 
1 
It is worth spending sorne time in anaiysing carefully the 
short run dynamics of the system for it wili become an interesting point 
for comparision when '.'le get to anotherforms of soiution, 
A positive productivity shock ieads the system from E to E 
o 1 
wich líes unambiguosly to the north east of E , It is easy to sho'll how 
o 
the slope of EE is negative and hence strikes overshoot follo',.¡ing an 
increase in (Appendix 2), 
Let the economy at the steady state F.o being hit by ano 
.. ~~J~~ ..... ~~~ ...... ~KKK: ~,KK,KJKJ~~~JJ'J ;~ ..... JK~JJJ ~J ~~~JJ"JJJ' .. ;':"' .. ~ ..... "- ..... 
v. .. O' ....... ..I,. ..... KKilJ'<KJ'J'v~ t"~JK ... '--_,'-' •• ,J ~"'JK""",,""~~KKlJd :-'J.v ........ v"KKI,K,KKI,K~J o~ .... v. 
The economics behind it seem a bit obscura ~s l~ ~s 
difficul t to think · .... hy rational unions should increase 
precisely froID 
-----"'.,-, 
¡¡¡<:;lit.! ':"V.l.U 
S(E ) 
o 
to s (E I ) 
o 
and then along 
S on i'":'!.pac'7 
,¡o 
JJJ~_JKJKKK~K;J~J ...... , , 
13. 
Union' s optimal choice of S depends on i ts valua tion of 
further wage increases, 
of an increase in ~ 1\ 
fJ.. . When the labour demand goes up because 
the valuation of higher wages goes up and then 
i t smoothly settles at new steady state level The 
explanation of why S overshoots relies here on the explanation of the 
behaviour of , for 
ds ~ 4 (j.. dÍ'" t 
.. 
~ to (25) 
• • t'¡'~ t S ~ 4 o< r- LC!J o (25' ) 
when increases so does n and w doesn' t change for i t is a 
predetermined 'Iariable. These two reasons work to make higher wages more 
desirable and hence K~ wich is a non prÉd~tÉrminÉd shadow price goes 
up accordingly. But i t does mOre than that, and i t overshoots' i ts long 
run leve1- Rational agÉn~s know that '"age (employment) \'lill be hihger 
(lower) on in the long run (as t~ ro) than i t ±s at t
o 
. So they vafue 
further wage increases at t oJ 'lIheo the increase hasn't taken place Jet, 
more than they ',¡i11 at t __ ce must then overshoot, 
Rational unions look only at their valuation fA as to decide 
their strike policy. This leads to a sudden increase in industrial 
action wich will die away smoothly as the objective of higher wages is 
apporoached and the cost in i' ,rms of fa11ing employment becomes hea'lier, 
Notice that we are talking about unanticipated pÉrmanÉEl~ 
;ro 
~I\ 
noting. AftÉ~ the ~ni~ial 
It i8 shown L'1 t:-te 
Appendix 2 how the dyns.:':-ücs :=.1.on2 the staole ma;q fold is gi'/en by 
• \ , 
~ 
" 
-
" e 
.:::.c , 
S 1- S-S • 27) '. i " C 
14. 
and consequently 
• 
n (28) 
where ~ is the stable (negative) eigenvalue of /j,c . It turns out to 
be the case that in this case the dynamics of the endogenous variables 
is similar to the partial adjustment mechanism sometimes used for 
empirical purposes. However this only holds for unanticipated permanent 
shocks hitting the system, Le. random walk like. Otherwise the partial 
adjustment mechanism doesn't follow fr'om a rational behaviour. To put it 
in other terms, the parameter of the adjustment is not structural and 
partial adjustment models are Lucas Criticable. 
A posi tive vlSge shock mOves the economy from E o to El in the 
long runo And is easy to show that El' must líe northwestwards with tho: 
new stable locus (F'F' ) going belo>! the old one (FF) , as in (Fig. 3) • 
IN 
.f" 
F' 
..; 
El 
... ~ . ~ .. ~ 
.", 
E.: !' 
1" 
L fí.:j' OJ S 
Unlike the case aboye, if the shock is unanticipated and 
permanent, the shado\'! price of w undershoots its long run fall, On 
impact this reduction goes . even further in the long run when the 
increase in '.'Iage lo\·¡ers Émplo·¡~ÉntK s o U goes on falling u!".til a ne'.'l 
I 
(t); in the mannÉ~ discussed above. 
Notice ha'.', :1"'.is ~És:KKK:l ':: nakes ser:S2 because what: a posi ~i ve 
wage shock means here is :3K!~ inc!"'ease i:-: ~hÉ barga:ni'lg pC:.·:er 0f t:he 
place; but as time goes 
, ' 
" 
i , 
1, 
¡ 
¡ 
!- , 
, 
l' ¡ 
I 
I 
I 
1-
" 
,~K 
, 
( 
I 
i. 
, 
r: 
" 
15. 
further discouraging effect on strikes due to a favourable position in 
the state variable. This asymetric behaviour of wages and strikes 
fo11owing different shocks is interesting and consistent '111 th some 'IIe11 
s tablished resul ts in labour economics. The sl\ape of the 'IIage dynamics 
constraint apparently reflects a causal relationship running from 
strikes to wages such that the higher the former the higher the 'IIage 
setlement achieved. This is not the 'IIhole story in our model both 
strikes and wages are endogenously determined and hence the nature of 
the dynamic relationship among them depends on the type of the exogenous 
shocks. Finding a positive assotiation between strikes and 'IIages in some 
cases, is not inconsistent' 'IIith the claim that 'strong unions (in the 
sense of unions having a high bargaining pOl'ier or high ('11) do need 
less industrial action to achieve a given pay target. This issue is 
analyzed in a someho'll different context by Gerosky et al (1984) (1985) 
and their results support to some exoent this complex relationship among 
wages and strikes. 
Let us finally get an expression for the discrete ini tial 
jump in S(t) following an unanticipated permanent change in either \~~ 
Or ~vl' Reca11ing the equatíon for the stable locus in eq. (2.5) of 
Appendix 2, is easy to check ho'll the horizontal (impact) change in S is 
given by, (NOTE 2) 
(29) 
;.. <. (-r '\ 1-r ( ,u- í "'1 -\] l~'\ ~ 1(', ~ 11- " " -~ \,..1'0 .....a "'" ~ J ,~ 
o( cf ~ 
:,3C, 
l- !l-
fol' Ó. t~Ó~t\ >'0 ;~lhÉrÉ \) ts +.:he unstable (positi"/e) É~gÉrl\'aluÉ Qf 6.C .. 
1"- , 
• ¡. 
I 
i 
¡. 
, 
rrr. A NON-COOPERATlVE APPROACH 
3.1.-NASH OPEN LOOP SOLUTION 
The eooperative solution (e) is a useful benehmark with wich is 
posible to compare the non-eooperative ones. The open-loop Nash assumption 
(OL) is the most natural al ternati ve in this case. As was pointed out in 
the previous seetions this solution implies that each agent is solving an 
optimal control problem independent·of the other's. 
To make this feasible the Nash assúmption, i. e. 
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, is not enough. We aetually reequire this sort of myopie behaviour in wich 
eaeh agent expeet the other' s instrument not reacting to ehanges on i ts 
own, to prevent fro," any form of leadership (NOTE 3) . But we also e;:>nsider 
p 1-
sta tic information pattern sO that no feedback is expeeted from the current 
state to the instrument. In particular (and now the time subscript becomes 
relevant) . 
Is under these two assumptions that we can state the i tn player optimal 
control problem as: 
\-\l: ~ (\}Jll:lt(Ü - i \)J1Ei~ - t EpiKlt~? 
wieh yields. 
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(33) 
and upon aggregation accross players, where we assume 
we get 
s ,.' 01. r- (34) 
, f.:: , E~'+íJ r -C t. -2 t \N J 
(35) 
and proceeding as 'l/e did in the (e) case we end up with 
• 
r'l/ (36) w aH a12 w bu b12 
= + 
s 21. 8 22 J s b21 b22 rn 
o 
w"hcl"¿ a11 -
n 
I~ 
I 
Et12 = el, 
a21 " '2 cJ. 'P 
a22 = (\-+r) 
bll = 1 
"12 = J 
~21 = 
b22 J~ 
1s easy to check that the system satisfies the saddle point;, 
property condition, because 
6. OL = det AOL o 
where 
All the dynamics we analyzed for the case of cooperation (e) still go 
through. 1t is easy to check how the, phase diagram shows 
-' slopping stable manyfold as in the cooperati ve case. The short run and • ,o 
long run dynamics go then in the same dirÉc'K",K~n as they did in that, 
setting. 1t is no worth going again into them. 
.' . ~ 
" 
, . 
, 
"size" of t../,: 
these effects. Given the extremely simplifing structure of the model, i t I 
What is more interesting though, is to compare the 
.. 
turns out co be tt~ case that most of these comparisions can be madejust I 
looking at the relati ve size of the relevant dete.'minants, i. e. tJ.c""s, f::, o\. O"" 
Let us see how the steady state solutions look like. 
(37) 
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11 OL " (40) 
under the assumption we made before 
al1 are positive. 
Comparisonamong (24) and (56) shows how. 
(NOTE 8) 
and similar1y from (13) (15) (16) (37) (39) (40): 
n 
e 
What is worth exp1aining is why unions strike more in a 
cooperative than in a non cooperative solution. The resu1 ts for wage and 
-, 
emp10yment fo11ow from the different use of the po1icy instrument in each 
case. 
If 'I:e lcck 
further wage increases is higher in the non cooperative 
o 
case. i-.C -r-:uall '{ ;,., fJ.._ 
- - I "-
is the ·,a1.1Jation foro each player of yet an::>ther increase in 'Hages ir in 
the non-cooperative case, and {J. e is the corresponding value that the IJKniM~·: 
cartel places on such increase. The differcnt behaviour is, obviouslj, 
In 
~KK,J j 
" __ C' K~K, 
20. 
level in wich the cost of further strikes increases by more than the 
corresponding return. But each union does not expect the other instrument's 
being affected by what it does, so the expected marginal return of further 
striking is given by 
(41) 
The underlying behaviour in the cooperati ve case is the same. NO'II, hO'lIever, 
each union. things that the other is going to increase the number of strikes 
exactly by the same amount than it does. The conjectural variation is then 
equal to one. The marginal return for the union of an increase in strikes 
1s the sum of i ts effect upon wages plus the effect 01' the corresponding 
increase in the other union's strikes. 
s~ = 2 
1 
Therefere, altough 
hence each union 
I f < « í i" o ¡ is easy to 
leads the amount of strikes 
cooperation (NOTE 4). 
(42) 
show how ¿ jJ., '> ~ H.. I ané. 
to a higher level under 
The (aL) solution does satisfy the saddle point equilibrium 
condi tion too. The short run dynamics following a given shock lüll be 
similar to the cooperative case. However the size of both the long run and 
the very short run (impact) changes are likely to be different. Two results 
come up from the steady state analysis, i. e. refering to th.e long term 
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impacts. l. 
If a ~osi ti'le pu::-e wage eh .......... 1 .. h.; ........ ...... ""'-', ..• _ ~v 
incr€ase in ',IIages is smaller aIld the fall in strikes bigger under ? 
cooperative behaviour than in a non cooperati ve one. l;Jhen a posi t i '/& 
employment shock comes, the resul ts are quite different; both wages and 
strikes rise by more if the unions do cooperate. 
._. ~, .. _----,. __ K_JJ,~ ---_ .... ~_K_J~J~K_J_ .. __ ._._"'-----
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The results for employment follow inmediately from what 
happens to wages. 
To unde;'stand such asymetric response to different shocks, i t 
is, as 'jllways, worth looking at what do these shocks do to the'" shadow 
price of wages, This is inmediately transmi ted to the union reaction in 
I 
terms'of strikes and that explains the long run impact on wages. The main 
difference among apure wage and an employment shock lies on their impact 
upon }J. 
Apure wage shock re laxes the wage constraint by "r'oducir.g a:1 
inmediate increase in the rate of growth of wages. This sudden dr'op in /'J~ 
is what causes a reduction in the number of strikes. But the impact upon 
strikes is bigger under cooperation. Under (OL) each union only eMes 
about i ts o'¡¡n valuation of wages) hence a drop on i t causes a modera-:e 
reduction in the amount of strikes. Under (e) though, each union is 
stI'iK~lng hi;h~~[' 'üécause i t lakes in account the return (in terms of 
higher wages) arising to both unions, SO '"hen t>- falls the observed 
return falls by more than under non-cooperation leading to a bigger drop 
in strikes and so to a smaller increase in wages, 
:,J;~;~J
"':1: ' 
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The same sort of reasons explain the bigger response of both 
wages and strikes to a productivity shock under cooperation. This is, in 
a way, much more illustrative of what the effect of union cooperation is 
about, for employment shock s are more frequent and realistic. A 
productivity shock does not relax the dynamic constraint, but, on the 
contrary, by rising employment makes the shadow price of wage increases 
to increase further. The incentive for the unions to capture part of this 
productivity shock is higher given its impact upon employment. By the 
same reasons, as before, this increase in p- leads to a bigger rise in 
the marginal return of further strikes under (e) than under (OL). As a 
consequence of that, cooperant unions are able to get a higher share of 
producti vi ty growth in terms of higher wages, leading to a '~orsÉ impact 
in terms of employment. 
Let us finally comment slightly Ol! the impact effect "ich can 
be more interesting as far as the cycle ie concerned. As 'IIe saw earlie,·, 
. . 
and for the saddle point property, the number of strikes jumped on impact 
following an unexpected shock. It ls interesting to see apart from the 
... 
long run changes, wether the sort run impact'of an employment shock (say) 
does differ wether we are under cooperation 01' not. To see this, we must 
calculate the horizontal shift of the st2.ble manyfold, for it defInes, as 
we saw, the of the size jump in the for'lSrd looking variable, follo'lling 
an unexpected shock wich is seen as a permanent one. The figure 4 shows 
the jump we try to measure: 
~ ¡ ., o 
I 
;, 
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From (29) we know that the impact effect upon S(t ) following a 
o 
shock at to i8 given by 
under (e). It i8 easy to how the corre8ponding effect under (OL) 1s givÉ~ 
by 
Then the impact effect folloving a similar pattern to the long run Ones 
(NOTE 5: ,) 
o 
\ 
\ 
L. I 
It~t6 
posi tive employment shocks than under non-cooperaticn; they al sO do get i-: 
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more quickly and through a bigger increase in the strike activity over tha 
long run. Strategic behaviour means that every uníon expects a li ttle 
return to its effort and so it does not get into highly active industrial 
action. If they do cooperate though the same cost lead to hígher returns 
hence strikes must rise above the non cooperative level. This is al sO 
translated into the short runo More turbulence is then expected under '"ell 
organiced unionism as well as a more efficient outcome of it. 
3.2.- NASH GLOSED LOOP SOLUTION 
Glosed loop solutions are associated to dynamic information 
patterns. As time goes' by, people' s information sets get enlarged by the 
new. coming information. policy rules can then be made dependents upon 
current and past values of the state variables. This means that each agent 
expects the other to react to the evolution of the 'Hage, and this effect ís 
taken in account when doing maximization. In particular now: 
The optimal plan for the íth union now does allo\" for the 
expected impact of changes in current wages upon the other uníon' s strike 
activity. The derívation of the optimal behavíour under closed loop is an 
straightforward exercise that can be carried out using the maximun 
principIe on (41). The results obtained only differ from those under OL, in 
the shadow price equation wich now takes in account the new arising 
information in determining the co-state dynamics. Glosed loop solutions 
present however conjectural non uniqueness (See Basar & Oldser (1982) fo!, " 
diS(;'..!3sion of this issue), WhaL chis means in eSSenCe l3 that under ,-'1 
dynamic information set, a given strategy admi ts infini te rÉprÉsÉnKtatK~on2 
(i,e. it can be written in a number of 'Jlays as dif'ferent functions e.:' 
different elements in the information set) and t~ÉrÉ exist as r.;any i:as:-
equilibría as differeni: representations of the cp-:i.r::al strategies of E'.?C: 
agent ';le could think r;:. 
25. 
In a deterministic context there is only a way of avoiding 
this problem. It consists of restricting our attention to a particular 
representation of each strategy; this means impossing the addi tional 
constraint for the solution being a function of a restricted set of 
elements in the information seto This permi ts us to pin down a single 
"representative" of each trajectory and henc.e of the optimal ones, 
restoring then the uniqueness'of the Nash solution. 
Among those restricted set of solutions there is .one wicl> .. has 
got particular appealing, this is the so called Feedback solution (F( 
* These strategies are the control functions S . t' ;';.ch satisfy: 
~ .... ,/ 
* and - S i t satisfy., the Qptimali ty' PrincipIe, i. e. there exist functions 
J(t,W) such that "., 
What is meant by (43) is that the optimal (F) strategies onl:; 
depend on the current value of the state. Each agent is assumed to be in 
possesion of a Feedback information· set. This helps to get a uniq'.lf> 
.cepresenLatlon of the strategy as 'l/as intented; bu:: the {Fj SOlU1:10:-: 
posses also another feature wich makes i t pr'7'fferable tn 8ny nther lJniq'~:É 
representation. It must satisfy the Bellaman' s PrincipIe of Optimali tj·. 
i . e. i t is an optimal trajectory. gi ven the inher i ted s óate and óhe 
expected optimízing behaviour. If the unían was allowed to rÉop~i::1icÉ .:t: 
any mOffi'oot it wouldn't choose a different strat~;;;:: ,J~:J S···. 
subgame perfect wich· makes it most desirable. ':':-t€ so.l .. KKK¡:~J::JK is ~2K:KKMJ:jK· .. -,..:;.:.. 
easy to obtain by ar: straightfon/ard use of the mrincip'J~ o:' Opti",a, i :j': 
-----------------
26. 
Let us define 
(45) 
where Vi (t, w) is the present value maximun vaIue function of union 1 
corresponding to the optimal choice of its instrument SI. The appIication 
of the Bellman's PrincipIe permits us to writte. 
and by defining thc current maximun vaIue function J' 
So that 
'll(W) = -rt e 
-rt .111 
e " 
that we redefine (45') as 
.1'1 
-rt K~ 1 
- re J 
(45' ) 
-_._--_._------------------
--_._-_._-_._--
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The optimality conditions are obtained from (47) in the usual manner. 
Differentiating w.r. t. sl' we get the. optimaLfeedback. plan for Sl (t), as 
,.,) tll··· 
-Sl +V\ J", = O (48) 
and the arbitrage condition is .obtained upo,n differentiating (47) w.r.t 
W(t), and applying the total differentiation rule 
or 
(49) 
where 
~ 
(.49) is better interpreted on the light of (33). If we give to 3", the usua: 
interpretation of the shadow price 01' W, (Kamien and Schwartz(1982)), (48) 
->l 
looks exacl tly as (33) except 1'or two bits. First of all, JI>.) does depene 
only ow current wages, whereas under open loop, the shadow price -"i el 
depend on W( O). This is due to the dynamic programing nature of the (,) 
solution as well as to the information set. This ensures the condi tion e,:' 
S* depending on current wages but not on past wage realizations. 
More relevant illdeed i5 
reason '.'lhy thiz appears in the arbi trage (:ondi ti"J~ ;'5 du~ ~::' the ':';"~_" ~ 
loop nature of the (F) solution. Each agent still expect:s no diree 
response of the others .instruments to changas on i ts o',m (t. ~, E j 'OS, ;6p~ 
':. eJ' However because optimal rules are based upon '¡j(t) the optimizi~·K~ 
union cannot ignore·. -che other union s"Grikes i r~spdnpÉ ::'0 c::.::!:1ge::,: l.r: 
~'lagÉ 1e'-.'e1. This ,cC?njectural element is goi!1g -:. 
between the (OL) and (F) solutions. It is interesting because i t emphasi "'c" 
" " "~:' " 
. K:~'"K:KKKJ~JK;~;KK ......... _---- ~"':_JJJKKKKKKK .... :.......-.. 
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tne crucial role of the informational assumption in differential games as 
-compared as with simple agent control theory. 
-- ----- ----
The way in wich this is going to affect the optimal level of 
strikes and wages ls clear from (48) (49). (48) is the same optimali ty 
condition as in rOL) except for its feedback nature, in the sense of giving 
as a rÉsuit~ an optimal strike rule as function of W{t). Where the 
conjecture aqout the other's- response is going to be important/ is in the 
arbitrage condition (49) to determine the expected return for the union of 
puting yet a bi-t more of pressure for higher wages. 
• J~\ ~ (rn, -2 tw ) .¡. cd\ ( 1"1-0') 'N i- -:. 
Jw"ll J2J~1 
(49' ) 
where represent.g the i conjecture of jth reaction to the state 
- tn 
As it stands, RHS (49') is still the alternative rate of return 
of ressources devoted to obtain higher wages. LHS (49') is Obviously the 
expected return of the-lastunit of ressources that the union spends (i.e, 
cost of strikes) in ge,tting higher wages. (49') looks farly 
arbitrage conditions we saw earlier but it is augmented by 
similar to the 
1 1 L¡. Suppose L ~ 
is negative, i t means that the first union expects a reduction in che 
industrial action to be ta::en by the other one as a consequence of highe!' 
wages;- this obviously enters negatively in the expected rate of return o: 
further strikes. 
Let us now proceded to put "tha :.l:Joel in the same for:7;8.--r "3.5 
jo 'the (e) and (OL) case. The state space representation is again of t",~ 
formo 
J~" EK~K'K -
~;~: 
---------
29. 
"h t 'o .. \>t, ~t 
:. ~ 
éh, :s \¡'1. '01.1. rO. 
• !;) 
where the matrices are given by: 
- - ~ a 11 = 
ai2 = c< 
v 21\ t a 21 = 
• a 22 = Er+~ -Y,O<L) -. 
b~l = 1 
b'12 = O '", ,/ 
b~l = O 
b~22 = -o< 
·_-·--·-·ce: where._the _ steps .. tC\ get (50) are the usual ones, i. e. aggregating over the 
FOC exploi ting the s'ymetry of the model: '" 
The interesting comparison among open-loop and feedback nor. 
oooperative solutions only depends on the sign of L, for the models are 
otherwise equal. In particular let us show how the sign of L is bound to b~ 
negative. If we take the first order condition (48) 'l/e can see ho"th~ 
marginal condition is affected by a change in W. In particular 
The neg?tive value of J -1 comes from the linear quadrati~ W'l/ 
structure of the model. It can be shown (!oIa11iaris & Brock (1982)) that i ~ 
leads to a concave maxi:mum value function On 1.1/. If that is thE' case, e.rC: 
( 
--- K_JKJ~J~~K_ .. -. .... ';;"':""';~ ...... ~JJJ"K_K~_ ..... _J~ 
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---__ ~thÉ conjectures are to be -consistent, it means that,-
(51) 
JJJJi~ = o 
~~J ~JJJJJJJJ
(52) 
---The impact- of this·on the long run -and short run dynamics of the model is 
fairly obvious. First of a11,' it does mean that the system in (50j 
satisfies the saddle point equilibrium condition. 
A F = det AF ¿, O 
V· 
\.f 
:. ~JK 
This isgood enough, for it leads to the same shape of reponse 
that ,we huye found sO far and permi ts us to discuss what difference the 
information assllmption makes, as far as the size of the short run and lor:;; 
run response of the system to exogenolls shocks is concerned. 
-, 
If we get the long run solutions of the model. 
" 
\l.)f ::::-
· ¡ · ''í'} 6,f! , (\'>\0,< ~iJ t" -\-0<, n. (53; 
S ... -1 [ cJ. E~':_2~f:)1 = -N 
~ 
\ \ ¡.' =.-
""_ .... \.\1- '.h /.'""l ; ~ 
\ ., \ , J . ..)" \P H _ 'f \ \,), ' . 
¡"'''"J'''IJ'I() \'1 
\\.J 
_A1I"! ' 
,K~"'/I . ;..--
~ J 1- ,. 
¡ 
.J 
2'P 
I 
,~~It is ~ Éasó~to see ~how~ undÉI'~ our familiar assumption 
~s EKp~J and 7 hence the following relations al so go through. ~K o\.. 
31. 
The rationale of why this happens is easly obtained from (49'). 
The setady state value of the shadow price is given by 
", 
'. 
b r"il~ 
i-') OÓ Ji (""" -Ji .-
The shadow price at the steady 'state (t;T) is the prÉsÉ~Kc 
discounted value of all future wage bill increases for the unóc~ 
membership. As i t stands, i t looks very much like the shado'o'I price l!n~~~ 
open-loop; the interesting thing to notice is the different duscount rac~K 
Unaer o!)en-loop. the subjective discount rate is (r+ C~ ,;. wich j~ ~~~ 
though this subjective discount factor is enlarged by :: - el. :... ~ beC2.:.:s'Ó 
withdrawling sorne ressources from industrial action permits to the unio~ :: 
earn, r some'Ñhere al so and ( ~ - c{ i~) in terms of future wag~ increases 1 :-::': 
lo',.¡er wages today mean higher wage growth both, Jr:ro:~;:!!·K --:::-;:'; "J::a['s~: :'K~:::K 
, " .., . , ~ 
'JI J ,.:.Hu ... Ht:: tl..lgi,el' KlKt::'¡~KKiKKK 01 
given 
\ 
,,'" r· 
.......... _ ..... _______ ~,,~K J~KKKKKK:KK~ ~J~·K·",:·;,,:{~I 
~JJJJJJJJJJKJJJJJJJJJKJJJJJ~JJ JJJJJJ~JJJJJJJJJJJJJJl 
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As far as the long run multipliersis concerned it is possible 
.. _to .. show ,:.. how the following ranking can .. be. stablished: 
ó~KE .. .. .. óK\)J,)~ 
~J>K 
0.\,/' o.\n· 
:. c:\SOl 
-:> 
<:\6' ¡: 
-(HnA ~'r: 
c\ WOl t.. Ó \\ll' 
.... 0. t~ 
,H'; 
:.-
\.,'; 1 >\ ÁS'·l c\ f \» a ~'\) (NOTE 6 ) 
and' the resul ts for employment follow inmediately from these, Again there 
is an interesting asymetry. in the response as' compared wi th the (OC) case. 
In both sort of shocks the (F) response of strikes is smaller in absolute 
value than the (OL) , one. The reason i5 to be found in the informational 
structure of each solution 
Take the producti vi ty shock (c. ~: ) The unions now try to 
gain a share in such shock in terms of higher wages and hence strikes go 
up. H.owever, under (F), '>each union expects the other to reduce its 
¡ 
I 
! . 
¡ 
I 
I 
f' ¡ 
I 
t· 
! 
1, 
r 
t ¡ 
r 
,-
r. 
! , ¡ 
r ¡ 
industrial action fOllowing the increases in wages; hence this introeuces a ¡. 
discouraging effect in for each union te strike further and hence aggregate 
~'"'J<JK ~""""""K' 'l- •• -<-. ......... -1- ..... ,...."t-, ""'t-..:_ 
.......... ó~ ,-,(, o.,.JJ ....... <:.0. ............................... .::> 
Exactly the opposi te happens 'l/han a wage shock hi ts the sys ~É:JK 
( ~ ~ ~ ). 301:h unions have an incentive to bring the strike acti vi ty dC·llr~K 
_...:.. -/-
to expect a much srr.s..ller \lfage increase than the posi tive shock imi tiall~ ... 
33. 
permits, therefore each union has got·an incentive-not to reduce the number 
of strikes as much as it did_ under (OL). The aggregate industrial action 
--fallsbutle-ss Jthan~\indÉrJJE OL); -arid -h,mce-un-ions-get -a higher- share in-the-
_________________ pKKK?si:t:~vÉ wage shock. __________ ~~~ _______________________ ~ __________ _ 
~ For the sake oL completeness, _let us compare tne very short run 
behaviour or ttle system following a posi tive (tu1anticipated and permanent) 
productivity shock. Proceeding in the same way as we did in previous cases, 
the impact effect is masured by the strikes boost following such shock, and 
it can be calqulated as the horizontal shift in the stable manifold. It can 
be shown how this takes the form of 
for a shock coming at t . 
o 
It follows inmediately from this that: 
L .. L (NOTE 7 \ 
",1ch al so tells us that the presence of a dynamic information ¡¡¡a!<es the 
unions more cautíous on their short run and long run responses to exogenous 
' .. 
·~K J_~~~ __ ~ _____ """"';"_~"_ ~J~K _ •• _-_.:--- "'1 
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3.3.':- FURTHER ClIo1~lEkTp ON THE SOLUTIONS" - . 
As we have seen there is an interesting pattern coming out from 
---the-;-analysis_we-.have._just.caI'rieLout •... TheI'e .. is., _in. .. par:ticular, a.· well 
defined pattern, wich features are worthwhile to analyse in more detail. As 
. a sort ·of summaryot . the previousresul ts we ·can 'compare the solutions as 
follows: 
W$' L. W ¿, W ol. c 
p~ ¿ SOL ¿ $ c (C.l) 
Nr > Nol,. > N· c 
a\ll" ¿ á~~K ¿ 0.1}.),: 
.::\q-l oK~t d Ej,,~ 
ó,S" <: aS OL < ao;, <\f' d4",i' M: n. 
(C.2) 
,\Í\¡: > a (\OL > Q 1), ctft Ó. f~ d fnl. 
o~" ) o. ~ll '> ó 1.\)<: 
\ 
~~:; c:\ó~ Mui 
os: ]« I d5 c l \~ldpc 1 
JJJK~KJJ:K,KK <\~w cKr~ o. ~~ (C.3) 
~I>~I>~ óí~ ~n~ di~ 
The main feature from (C.1) - (C. 3) ís the 
role played by the (OL) solution among the tC'IO other ones. This se,""''' 
susprising at first gla:;ce I for (OL) seems to represent. a to::al lac~ ,K~ 
solution incorporates pM~É ipartial, view oi what the other union ~s gc~:': 
, 
, 
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to do. This again remarks the differenee between eooperation a~d 
informational assumptions in this dynamie game., 
-. J~J~J -- K_JJ~J~K_JJJJJJJ~JJ~JJ rndÉr~E OLt,-both-the-Nash --and--the -inf'ormational"'-conj ectures 2.!"e--
set to zero. Eaeh agent's expeetations about its rival reaetions are flato 
Under (el the increase in Si is 
takes 
always simultaneous toan equal increase in 
the cartel in account such intereaction and finds s j' henee 
worthwhile to increase both union's level of industrial action. Recall that 
the optimization procedure for a cartel leads té the same result that 
have been achieved un del' non-cooperation prove,ded each agent expected 
would 
, ó. Sj _ \ 
aS, -. 
Hence the cooperative solution can be interpreted ei ther as a 
centralized cartel or an agreement whereby each union chosses i ':s 
instrument optimally on its own, under the assumption that the other 
fo11ows i t on a one for one basis (APPEHDIX 3). This obviously makes Éa~h 
union more keen on increasing the strike activi ty due to the addi tio::al 
- bonus of the simul taaneous increase in the ri val ~ s pressure. As we see [re;:; 
(e.l)-(e.3), the level of strikes is always set up at a higher level unée:' 
(el than otherwiso. The same pattern ls observed for the long :,u:: 
multipliers and, as was shown earlier, for the impaet effects. Stri:'-es 
always react by more (in any direction) under cooperation, due to tne 
eneouraging effect of the induced response of the other union. 
As i t stands, the informational assumption plays an entirelj" 
different role. Altough the information contents of the (F) solution is 
higher than that of (OL) and sO it seems to be halfway between (OL) a::d 
(e) , actually the nature of the information introduces a discourag:'r!i; 
effect on strikes, UnoBr Nash! each un ion still -?".l2SS a flat reac-::or: :J:J'K~:J:J
the other, to its strikes, hence no further incentiv9 "':0 :r.C!"'S'?-:::: 
industrial pressure.works through this channel. 3ut on to~ of ~'J --"', le. ." , 
the unien (correctly) guess the negati ve feedback from · .. :ages to tte ot~É~··Ks 
policy instrument if finds less interesting to strike as much as i ~ ', .. ':)'K:~:: 
havc done other\'lise. I~ fae"::, "::!':e reac-tir:!,",! of .;:- ........ ;...·Cts E~n eithe:-- ~iK!'scJ:J:KJJ
36. 
IV.-·THE SOLUTIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
So far me have relied upon subgame perfect strategies to get 
-,-.--.. -c-:-:-. J~'7=JJ:J~J·ridJofJJnlrctlniquÉnÉss· problems; ··There is -however ... another natural way in 
wich dynamic programing can be justified as a way of solving the 
. optimization program possed to the agentes. 
When an stochastic element ls brought into the system and under 
certain .conditions of statistical lndependence, each. strategy under closed 
loop information has got a unique representation, Therefore i t is nO 1", ~É,' 
possible to represent a given strategy in a dj~fÉrÉnt combination of pas~ 
values of the state (Basar and Oldser (1982) )bÉ~a:~3É the realization Of the 
disturbance drives a wedge between the expected and the actual dynamics o: 
the system. Hence an optimal rule 
S*(t) - S*(W(t» 
cannot be written in terms of \'I(t-1) for the relationship betweefl \>I(t) =d 
W(i;-1) includes a disturba 'Ice term, SO that it ·is not possible to ~'T'::'t~E 
W(t) as a function of W(t-1) only, 
The stochastic version of the model also permi ts us to dra· .... 
some interesting conclussions about the ,/aY in wich true stochastic 
disturbances affect the behaviour of the agents. The modelling 0: 
uncertainty is deliberately naive, but it gives sOme insight of furtrKÉ~ 
ways in wich stochastic disturbances can be introduced. 
now stocha8ti~: and hence the . wage , increas8 is led by dÉtÉrfT1i;:i"3JrJ:~ 
component, p~us the unexpected shocks in the bargaining positions. 
\ 
. - ---
--------
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:dz is a Wiener process with zero mean and-unit variance andC'is afunction 
- nJ:'~JnJ:JJEJIk -$--- x-__ ~K) ---.- -------( 59 )---_~ _____ J~J~=J~"'_=_ __ -\- ~_ ti U) JJ~:¡' ~J _ ---- --- --- -- --
wich tells us halo! a particular' normalized shock affects the change in the -_. 
state. The most important thing to bear in mind is that dZ are indpendently 
distributed with variance propor:tional to dt, and then equation ("S) is no 
differentaiole. Let us start by taking the simplest possible assumption 
about (59);. 
____ O. 
cr- ~ c:::r E~") (59' ) 
. -4.1.- COOPERATIVE SOLUT:::ON--
____ o 
J~JJÚ~\K';É dÉfinÉ~J;;':JY, u~ .,;:-r. u2 :1:l1e cooperative so¡;';tion -"'can be 
easily . obtained. The - optimal plan s* is the one wich sa-cisfies the 
.. 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, 
(60) 
(APPENDIX 4) 
For a ~Éll defined linear quadratic probl~~, thÉ~É exists n~o 
function wich satisfies e (60), hence '.'le can procede s-:raight to dra',', thr;,; 
main features of such SOl'.1tion. 
JJ_:~ ... __ .~_KJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ! 
J~_ .. - JJJJJJJJ~J
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¡ 
I 
! 
I 
( 
(ill) I 
_ i 
---.--.. _---- -- --- I 
and-the opti:miü wage-levelmus;;-satisfy--the arbi trage condi tion --
e 
r 1w - Tb'N -=-
-=-~ TI: E~J'r d J~~ c. J \IJ\V\IJ (62) 
(61) and (62) can be rearranged in a familiar looking form 
(61' ) 
(62' ) 
where the Ito's rule has been applied to J W 
(63) 
o 
(64) 
The interpretation of (61') i·s the ene 'lIe saw in previous 
cases. So does {62') al tough i t contains a new bit '.'Iich captures a r:sk 
premium fo!"' the expected return on higher ·,.,ages due to the uncertainty in 
lookS exac--:lj' as tr.e arbitr'age condition under cer-'cair,l:j' as given by (4"9 ti' 
! 
, 
, . 
J~KJ_K_JJ_KJ_K_JJJJJ
._---- --;--.--------
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. , 
except for the last positive under risk avÉrsio~ 
(i.e. concave J), and it augments the alternative expected return. If the 
union does not "invest in higher. wages" it does get (r+ r ) as usual, plus 
the return of non increasing uncertainty. Actually, if w rises it increases 
i ts variance and for a risk averse union this is utility reducing. 
To analyze the consequences of introducing uncertainty we only 
compare feedback (cooperative vs. non cooperative) solutions as the only 
m'eaningful qnes. In an stochastic world open loop strategies commi t the 
players to a given behavioural rule with no accountwhatsoever for realized 
shocks. Fedback strategies on the other hand are much more realistic s fo, 
they account for all information available up to t, and so they someho-,; 
react to past shocks. On the ohter_ hand the assumption of static 
information (open loop) structures is not a realistic one; i ts main role 
was in the deterministic setting to provide a benchmark for comparisior., 
and furthmore to provlde one solution fo,- the non uniqueness problem. Nc'''' 
the problern. of non uniquÉn:~ss:lKIndÉr:KclE)sÉd, loop., information pattern is r.e 
longer present, so we can focus in amost interesting comparative ana1ysis. 
The concept of steady state equilibria we have been tall<i"s 
about so far, does not appear useful in an stochastic netting. There are 
several concepts of stochastic equilibrium (Malliardis and Brock (1982»), 
among the broadeI' ones is that of stationary distI'ibution. By this we mean, 
the existence of the solution of the stochastic diffeI'ential equation 'lIich 
is a time independent random variable. To get such a distribution foI' (58) 
we first need to wI'itte it'in the form: 
o 
To do this !¡fe proced to substituté 'Jut S fo!' tis op-:i.::-,al ;::K:KK~:J_ 
rÉprÉ~Éntation in terms of W(t' (the proceduI'e ls explained in some de:ail 
as it would be usad late, too). 
From 0"1' -, .... "',4 a~~rÉca""'¡J'''J aJ~'s~ ~ S \'e cet 
" - ! a .• u '::-5 -'=' ....... 1. • .;. '-. v .=; ~,l I 2' lO '=' 
~ . -_. JJJJJ~JJJ~~KJ_K_~'J
s = 4 o( Jc. 
w 
That can be expressed as 
where K1 
K~~JJ~~JJ~JJKJ~JJ
40. 
(66) 
(67) 
Before to proceed further, a few comments are in order about the '1alues of' 
It ls eazy to check how. 
>0 L..O 
This is as one should expect, for increasing uncertainty must both, reduce 
the level of strikes for a given wage level and dampen the change in 
strikes in response to changes in wages. The uncertainty is associated he're 
wi th higher wages and hence, unions will be more cautious in using the 
strike policy for the pay off of higher strikes is now lower. Similarly, 
any increase in the wage level will produce a bigger drop in the strike 
activity by the 8ame r88Snns, 
We can s~É how an increase in the elastici ty of labo'jr daj,an~ 
e:'fects 1":2' 1:1 ir: th( sarl.e way oro this for obvious r'pasons. The h:"~h8r "':!1'2-
Élas~icitó, the lower the pay off higher ;.¡ag '3' S , JO the use of strikes 'KK,i;'~ 
be somehow reduced. 
>0 
d k , LO 
," 
41. 
Now we can proceed to plugg (67) in (58) to get 
dW (t) = EJÉ~tEt) + 81. ) (68) 
where, 
and if' the stationary equilibrium d'istribution exists, i t takes the form 
(69) 
or 
(69' i 
dW = .. 1 ""' (Malliards and Brock( 1982» 
The important thing about ,the ÉxistÉnc~ of f\ (W), is that i t permits us 
an analysis close to the deterministic case. In particular it can be sho~~ 
how. 
= O (70 ) 
and this is satisfied in our case for t(W) = W. (NOTE 8 ). Hence (7C) 
becomes 
E í -e' '" + e",l ~ A ! ., (f v 
I 
" 
¿ I 
-
..J 
or 
É~ 
E (vi ) = c 191 
~, 
JJJJ~~_ ..... _-,--
42. 
And is precisely (71), wha,t we can to compare how good is the 
apro'ximation of the deterministic steatd for the resul t under uncertainty. 
JJJJItJJcanJJoÉJJshownJ~that - (1jT can be' >/ri tten- as: 
'~~ccJJJcJc:==J=J tKu'¡'JIKKJ~íp,J~J -- JJ:;J;~JJJJJ=JJJJJJccJJJ=JJJJJJJJJJc 
-'N, : - '" (NOTE 9) 
(!> ~ 6' c< ~_ k,. 
(l3' ) 
where 
k, ) 
<:1""- O 
This permits us to compare among the deterministic and the stochastic 
componénts, in simil~ grounds. Actually from (13') we have 
á ('{.¡ c. • E (vJ,)j 
c\ ~ -~ __ 
>0 
--As -Vie saw -earlier K2 grows and K, falls wi th <;J, hence for posi Uve 'O" 
the expected value of the stationary distribution of wages is lower than 
the deterministic steady state. By the same reason thi,s difference gets 
bigger as uncertainty increases. 
If Ole substitute out (71) into the expected value of (67) 'lIe 
can see how the expected stationary value of strikes is lower than the 
corresponding deterministic steady state value (NOTE 10). 
d, 2. -NON-COOPER.A.TIVE SQLI)TI0N 
Bringing uncertainty in af'fects the non-coopera ti ve solution i:, 
a similar manner than i t did wi th the the cooperati ve one, Let us ;;0 
quickly through the modelo The optimal plan of each player "'us~ s",t~3f:r, 
-, 
,ih : 
JWI),) J 
• < c,;-.. " ... ,. 
43. 
(73) 
(74) 
and using Ito's lemma we get, upon aggregation: 
(75) 
where, ::\ + p~ _ 
J _ cJ I -+J ,K,,~~c __ -
s = 
The int~rprÉtation of (75) (76) is the usual one, except by the 
term (- o(L) 'l/ich is an augmenting bit in the alternative rate of retu:,,,., 
due to the expected negati ve feedback from wages to the other union' s 1 
strike level. 
value of 
To be able to obtain an explici t solution for the 
[} 
the stationary distribution (the closest thing to 
o 
seterministic steadyd state concept), 'l/e proceed 
cooperative case. Let us "ritte. 
expected 
the 
the i exactly as we did in 
where t 
r ' .. ~ 
1)2 =- E~lK F <r'- r-"2 r') -1- [(0-'- r- 2 [>J\ n o< Ji' Th . f 
. I 
.J 
·:".' . '.- ... -. 
----------------- ---------
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(NOTE 11) 
where again a11 the results í'or the case oí' coop_Érat~o~g~_1;llrMllghK se 
that we can wri tte the expected value oí' the stationary distribution unde" 
no-cooperation as: 
(78) -
where 
wich .is oDviously bigger than the steady state value in the determinis':ic 
case. 
\).,J F '.: (53' ) 
._.=---- .. ~JJ=JJ ----:;: - .. ~~JJ:KJJJJKJJ=JJK~ .• \ 
- - J~'J _. -
where 
-¡ 
= D. \ 
1 <:J":O 
Here again the expected level oí' strikes and the expec:-;: 
(stationary) level oí'. wages are both lower than the corrÉspondic'~1 
deterministic steady state values. The presence oí' uncertain randon shoc:·:~ I 
wi th aí'í'ect the wage growth reduces the pay-oí'í' . oí' strikes í'or risk avÉ~s~1 
unlons. 
Both resul ts are obviosuly crucially dependent our the 'Hay .-
wich uncertainty has been broght into our modelo :óad the variance of :0.'0 
shocks been decreasing in wages 'Ñe would have got exactly the Opp0S:'":-:: 
results. 
45. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS --.- -- -- .---. J~JJJJ -
JJJJJ~~JJJ~JJJJ - - ~JJ - --- - -------- ----- -------
Under the' sTmplii'ying assumptions put forward in the 
introduction, we have been able to derive closed form solutions for wages, 
.. strikes-and employment, -in' a dynamic game -modelo The main -resul ts are the 
i'ollowing ones. 
The model displays a nice dynamic structure wi th the saddle 
point property. It enables us to pin down a unique dynamic path of wages, 
strikes and·employment after en exogenous shock has taken place. When the 
____ bargainin'"-power---ºC the unions improves, wages go up._ whereas strikes .. and 
employment fallo A posi ti ve shock in the labour demand on the other hand 
increases wages, employment and strikes. We can i'ind then diffepent 
behavioup of the wage/stpikes pair depending on the nature of the exogenous 
s~,,Jck~_ in the -economy ._-____ .. ~~KJ_J
.. 
Tur~ing to the game theoretic approach we found a well 
-stablished pattern of solutions between the cooperative and non-cooperative 
approach. These resul ts are the ones one should expect and they may be 
taken as an straighti'orward extension oi' an static game between several 
unions. What is more interesting though, is the pattern we found undep 
alternative informational assumptions in the dynamic contexto In particular 
the difference between the cooperati ve and non-cooperati ve approach is 
systematically enlarged when a closed loop (feedback) information set is 
assumed for the unions. This pattern holds for both the short run and long 
run multipliers, as well as for the steady state solutions. 
The introduction of uncertain.t:: in the 'I1age ou-:cc.;:rrle r:iK3~~És -::::;2 
resul ts persistently dif'ferent from those above. In the las t sectio" ';le 
consider the bargaining pO'Jier of the union subject to random shcc:':s ',!ic:-:: 
variance ls increasing in the level of wages. In that case the ÉxpÉc~Éd 
value of the stationary dls~rlcu:ion of ~3g~p a~d s:~ikÉ2 is lo~É~ :~a~ :~~ 
cOr'responding steady stat-= 3·K:;~u:::i;~]~J,p :"i'. e:;:.: C~3·_~K:":J:JJK':":JK":'3J:':'C ::3..2e. _:-:-.;;_'':''---2-:--
18 therefore greater in the uncertain case. This result ls explained by ~hÉ 
linear cuadratic format of -che model '.'Iich makes the unicn risk ave:-s€ &{',c: 
e 46, 
more keen in accepting_lower wages (wich reduces _the variance of the rando, 
shocks) . 
The natural extension of this model is to make explicit of th, 
JJ_KJK_J~JJJJ~JJ=J:JJJJJ~JJJ_J::JJKJK_~JJJJJ -
Tirm I s bahaviour, endogenizing i ts role in the bargaining process. Bu' 
bÉfo~É_ to do "that i ti_s_also in_teresting_making_ the sochastic nature of thó 
model les,;: naive. In particular the variance' of the shocks affecting th, 
relative bargaining power could be made depe,ndent on the level of strikÉ~ 
as well. This could capture the fact that when a negative shock affect::: 
the union' s bargaining power i ts impact upon the ¡'/age growth is _bigger 
(worse) the higher the level of strikes. Industrial action would have not 
only a 'direct effect upon the wage outcome, bl, 'also an indirect one ",icr, 
-./ 
',/ 
_______ depends_ On the- (favourable or,otherwise) - environment in wich nogotiationE 
take plac". 
¡ 
I 
APENDIX 1 
----- - ----------- - JJJJJ~JJK ------------------------ ----
Aggregating ower (9) (10) in the text we get 
S= 4C<~; 
so that 
• • 
S = 4 "" 1-" 
but from (11) in (1.2) 
but from (1.1) into (1.3) 
s = 4 O( [ (r s 
+ r ) "cJ.. 
· y S = 4 o< P w + (r + ~ ) S - 2 O( ~ n 
So that we have 
• ,., 
i¡J = 
- (" \'1 + 0\ S + 
5=40\t VJ + S-2c{ r n 
47. 
---------- --==-c-----------
(1.1 ) 
(1. 2) 
(.1. 3) 
o 
(1.4; 
( 1. 5) 
.. ,J,J,_K_JJJ,JJJ~_ ......... JJJ~ 
APPENDIX 2 
The solution of the differentia1 system yie1ds the following 
,expressi<ms" 
(2.1 ) 
SCl;;') = el (2.2) 
* * Fo!' a given steady state (\'1 • S ) the system is continnous in time. 
Furthermore. the transversali ty condi tion as we 1et T ~ ct::J lS the 
condition of convergence towards the steady state. That recquires e 2 =0 
_~J,JJJ:c':cc:'::if_ we assuine that. the' saddle pOinf conditíon is satisfied and V> o. 
The system takÉ~ then the form of 
w(t) 
S(t) 
= e x É~~ 1 1 
= e e),t. 
1 
* + w 
* + S 
where [~~ is the eigenvector associated to A 
Differentiating with respect time we get (26) (27) in the text 
. \ 
W (t) = ,,(\'J(t) 
• 
S (t) = A (S(t) - s*) 
wich only holds along the st?~:'=! :2K!::!":M~JJ:K 
(2.1' ) 
(2.2' ) 
(2,3) 
(2,4) 
48. 
49. 
--Given -that --- ~ is the stable (negative) 
expresion is given by 
J~JJJ ----- -- -----
(2.5) 
and hence 
~4'J ~ = Yo {a22 - all) -l(a22-a21 )2 + 4 a21a12}/Z} LO 
hence the slope is negatíve, because if (2.3) and (2.4) are both equal1y 
-ineaningfur representatioris -of the stab1e manyfo1d we can proceed to get 
the slope as fo110ws • 
• hence \N 
or 
IX A. A w* + 
'( w) w = S + (2.5) ~+~ r-""" 
is the equation for FF, and hence 
¿o 
n... \ \ I ~KK,K l' 
50. 
APPENDIX 3 
____ Imagine_we ___ let _ both unions_ to __ optimize_ on_ theirown _ both under __ the 
conjectural assumption 
This would lead to maximiza 
"A \ . \ "2 1-\, "" -\Ntl- -S + 
'2.. 2 ~ (3.1 ) 
SI (3.2) 
" (3.3) 
wich upon aggregation means 
s -=- o< ~~ (3.4) 
ff\;, (r+' j 1~1'7 - Ct, -L f'IN) (3.5) 
wich yields the same result as the cooperative case 
~~r' 
( ( + ~ r" -
APPENDIX 4 
-------
Let the (present vaIue) maximum vaIue function 
and appIying BeIIaman's PrincipIe 
ButV(w + /:;. w, t + C!. t) = dV + V (w,t) 
dw + y, V (dw)2 
'ww 
where again the multiplication rules 
dt • dt = O 
dz • dt = O 
dz • dz = dt 
have be en applied ~hroughoutK 
Hence we can plugg (4.3) in (4.2) 
, • -51:-1 .. ! "1" ' 
51. 
(4,1) 
.. - , 
(4.3) 
([ .. 
52. 
(4.5) 
but taking expectations· in RHS (4.4), the term on dz vanishes, and 
dividing by dt all-through·we get 
(4.6) 
If we now define the current maximum value function J, and let T -'P te as 
to get rid of the time dependence of J, we can do 
V -rt J = e w w (4.8) 
Vt 
-rt -rt 
= -re J + e J t (4.9) 
and hence plugging (4.7) - (4.9) in (4.6) we get the equation (60) in the 
texto 
APPENDIX 5 
We need a c10sed for solution·for S, so we procesed as fo11ows: 
Let us guess 
J = K1W - K w
2 
+ K 2 o. 
then 
Therefore, p1ugging (5.2) - (5,4) into (60) 
r(Ko+K1W-K2W
2 ) = t y, 3' nW -Y, ~w2_ 
+ 8 2 2 O( K1 K2w- r K1'" + 2K2 r w + 
.- 8 C>{2K1 K2W - 8 ~2h1 K2W + 16 ó(2K22w2 
.50 that the following relations must hold 
-rK 2 = - Y, ~ , K..., 0 2 ~ 
53. 
(5.1 ) 
ER,~ ) 
(5.3) 
",(5,4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
54. 
(5.7) 
JJcJJJJJJJJJJJJJ~J
-- (5.8) 
From (5.6) 
~ 0(2 h~= (¿. - r - 2 f ) k 2 - Y, t = O 
k~ '.:.' ¡ (cr'. (. '0' ':. It q" (.'I'l +\é,,' '1' J} (5.9¡ 
where to ensure K2 "> O we chosse the posi ti ve root K 2' 
(5.10) 
Similary 
1<0 1 - - (5.ll ) 
'í 
wher'e the range of ~ \Ml_~ t\ is that ;-:ich per-mi ts'; "';> _. w 
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NOTES 
(il This I shall carr"'j on throughout the analysis. It is fair to do so, 
be-cause ~<'II ~~ are p-;"re indÉx~s of exogenousshift factors that we 
can choose to have a well defined problem. 1s is however possible to 
think off corner steady state solutions in wich 
and hence S *,=0 , but are not of special -interest on this simple 
example. 
l 2) Actually from eq. (5)· in Appendix 2 we I ve got 
~s+l E')K\IJ,+'\JK;~ 
'¡\+\> -,- ~f 0' ~wJ 
ThLs the horizontal shift in S is given by 
ds - .: J (Adw, + ótiJ:o -
~ (- .1. E~+r) + 0 <:\ \~ -- - ::-d.. b.<. 
_ ,1 {6'~ A( re~ d t~ -= -_ .... - o 
o< 
( . \\J 
where \J is the unstable (positive) eigenvalue oí"' 6. (., wich is giver. 
by 
hence 
--- ----_ .. 
-. - "r' 71' " .. 
56. 
because the term under the square root is bigger than the ter m 
outsidÉ~J
-.-----(3) One could impose consistent conjectural variations CCV as explained 
in Basar (1985 ). Perry (1984). Bresnashan (1982). The 
consideration of CCV however is not yet broadly accepted as a me 
aningful :concel't" of non cooperative equilibrium. It posses many 
. -:-: ~:_K~::,~~ complicatións':in- the- solution-:-ancf it ~ is beyond the scope: of this 
explanatory example. 
(4 ) Actually is easy to- see how this is so as 
- ((> ( (>-+t" ') f- 4 «' 'i> J ~ : 
toOL 
(5) ACtually let us claim: 
AOl :> 2)., 
ÁoL 6,,' 
then 
Lo 
""> 2 ~cK !'V'" -, ~ V 60L D.t;.. 
but 
r ... , , 
o 
57. 
--- JJ~~ J~ - ---
-- andJisJÉsaóJtoJchÉck~JthatJ,JJJJJJ~JJ~~ 
wich -contradrCfs the 6laim. 
Then it must be the case that 
6 )This similarity of ranking among short and long run effects is 
intuitively appealing. Under rational expectations, the initial 
movement in the forward looking variables is a kind of first step of 
the present value of the total long run change. It is then clear 
that the bigger the long run response the stronger the sort run one 
too, in this optimizing models. 
_~_=J==~o~~_J;J_,,~~JJo=_·JJJ~,JcJJ - ,_o _~=J=K ___ - ___ . ___ --. 
-- -
( r.¡) If we compare (37 ) and (53) we see how 
c\ ~f -1 ( f!''¡'¡-- c< L) ~~Kx :. - ~~ 
~ f.> +- r -i ":. :. L 
b()(. 0' (('>HJ;- 20< ¡ 
'f (?>+ 2o(''f f.!>+r 
! 
f$+ ¡-- C(L A O ~ \ 
L 
1,.:l7í-d..i,. 
:. ~ 
~E í"H- «L) +20< ¡ f {'o + 2.c<l 'f' f::,~ 
r+'-« L 
( 8) Recall 
lp~1KK t,{! ACL ~ -::. (\f/ " ~ \jot 6CL 
-....j,.-. 
58. 
----
-
------- :~JJ:J~ ---------where again--1.- ana '\J. --are the stable' (negative) -and unstab_ 
~_~_~ ___ ~ ___ e,igenvalue of the system_respectively. But 
~ - - -
\1:: ltE~~;J~:K~ ~iE~I\+l\t~1K 
..... J~K 
ThÉrÉf6r~, the ,iffi-pact -effect under (F) is samller than under (OLí 
',(9) The conditions on-r('II) are, to be t'llice continuosly differentiac: 
and 
)..).w (r I (1,\) 'j <:¡-t W ¡ 
~~Cl 
but forf(w) = w 
and is easy to check that this express ion satisfy tte condi tions 
above, 
~J~JJ~~JJJJJ~~JJ
59. 
(10) (13') can be obtained by proceeding exact1y in the same way as we 
_ oJJ~J~J _____ ~~ ___ did_í~hÉ _s_tE)cha~ tig __ c<l.se to_ oi)j;ainS, .K1 , K2 , 
be easily checked how (13) and (13') coincide 
~JJJJJJJcJJJ=JJJJJ=JJJJJJ
(11) Is easy to see how 
Furthermore i t -can_ 
This expression is decreasing in O- , and hence as uncertainty 
-- -'--.--it-ícreases, th¿- (positive) -- difference between S an E (S) gets 
bigger. 
(12) 1s easy to check how DI' D2 are obtained exactly as K1' K2 were: An 
sketch of the process is given below. 
, 
Let us guess: 
- J~ { r (d + d1w - 2 d2w ) = o 
"""" __ "" and hence" 
so that 
= 
\ (.\1 
but 
\' +f:,+ 
I 
-U 0(,2 (d 2 1 
+ 2 r d2w 2 
60. 
Y, 6'n 'ÑJ~'m 2 w 
2 2 
-4d d w) - ~ d1"" + 4d2 w 1 2 
2 c< 2d 2 2 + 1 4 o( d1d2'" 
o 
\ 
where 
===========loJ~= 2d~o_~ ___ ~~ J~~K~J~J~_K 
- ~ - ---
-
O = 2d ~~J=J~_l~Ki __ . 
--O2 = 2d2:=_ 
hence 
. - -=- _-:----,- -.. -
·-as given in the texto 
r> 
Tos" 
61. 
o· 
. 
62. 
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